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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Dorothy Ellen Marx appeals from the order suspending sentence

On

and order of probation.

appeal,

Marx

Statement

Of The

The

state

Facts

discretion

when

it

privileges.

charged Marx With felony driving under the inﬂuence (DUI), Idaho Code §§ 18-

Marx pled not guilty, and the case was

1)

set forjury

(46206 R., pp.36-37.) The jury found Marx guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under

the inﬂuence 0f alcohol, and

Marx admitted that

she had a prior felony

DUI

previous ﬁfteen years. (46206 R., pp.3 12, 325-26; 5/1 1/1 8 Tr., p.474, L.19
this

its

And Course Of The Proceedings

8004(1)(a), 18-8005(9). (46206 R., pp.22-24.

trial.

abused

asserts the district court

imposed a ﬁve-year absolute suspension 0f her driving

after retained jurisdiction

was Marx’s

sixth lifetime

DUI

conviction, and second felony

p.494, Ls. 20-22; 3/1 1/19 Tr., p.8, L.25

(5/1 1/18 Tr., p.486,

L.15 — p.487, L.1

—

p.9, L.2.)

The

DUI

conviction Within the

— p.480, L23.)

conviction.

district court set the

In fact,

(7/9/18 Tr.,

case for sentencing.

1.)

During sentencing, the court imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, With two years ﬁxed,

and retained

jurisdiction.

imposed a ﬁve-year

(7/9/18 Tr., p.527, Ls.7-10;

driver’s license suspension.

conviction stated, “IT IS

will have absolutely

(5) years,

n0 driving privileges

Citations to the prior Clerk’s

R.99

Record

The court

also

The judgment of

defendant’s driver’s license 0r permit

is

pursuant to LC. § 18-8005, during which time Defendant

.

.

.”
.

(46206 R., p.360.)

judgment 0f conviction, but she did not challenge her

1

R., pp.359-62.)

(7/9/19 Tr., p.528, Ls.4-13.)

HEREBY ORDERED that the

suspended for a period 0f ﬁve

46206

in docket

Marx appealed from

driver’s license suspension.

number 46206-2018

the

(46206 R.,

Will be designated as

“46206

pp.373-79.) The court of appeals afﬁrmed. State V. Marx, Docket N0. 46206 (Ct. App.

May

16,

2019) (unpublished).
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the court imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve
years, with

two years ﬁxed, and suspended the sentence.

placed Marx on probation for a period often years. (3/ 1

(3/1 1/19 Tr., p.26, Ls. 10-16.)

1/ 19 Tr., p.26, Ls.

1

5- 1 6.)

The court

The court

stated,

“Judge Carey has ordered, and the order continues from the judgment, that you absolutely have no
driving privileges for

release

ﬁve

from custody.”

years.

A11 driving privileges are suspended for ﬁve years from your

(3/1 1/19 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-12.2)

On March

15,

2018, the court entered the

order suspending sentence after retained jurisdiction and order 0f probation, which stated: “IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant’s
ﬁve

(5) years during

driver’s license or permit is suspended for a period 0f

which time Defendant Will have absolutely n0 driving privileges.”

Marx timely appealed.

(R., p.27.)

(R., pp.34-37.)

2

Judge Carey presided over the trial and sentencing hearing, but Judge Baskin presided over the
jurisdictional review hearing. (46206 R., pp.3 13, 355; R., p.21.)
2

ISSUE
Marx

states the issue

Did
0f

its

0n appeal

as:

the district court abuse

legal authority,

When

it

its

discretion

by

acting outside the boundaries

imposed upon Ms. Marx a ﬁve-year absolute

suspension of her driving privileges?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Marx

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by imposing

year suspension of her driving privileges upon her second conviction for felony

DUI?

a ﬁve-

ARGUMENT
Marx Has
A.

Failed

To Show That The

District

Court Abused

Discretion

Introduction

The

district court

the district court abused

imposed a ﬁve-year suspension of Marx’s

its

discretion because

it

acted “beyond

“a ﬁve-year absolute suspension of [her] driving privileges.”

argument lacks merit because a proper reading of

privileges) unless

Standard

and

until the defendant requests

and the

its

driver’s license.

legal authority”

Marx

argues

When it imposed

(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)

Marx’s

§18-8005(6)(d) establishes that a

I.C.

defendant’s driving privileges remain absolutely suspended

B.

Its

(i.e.,

suspended Without restricted

district court grants

such privileges.

Of Review

“[O]nly a one-year suspension

is

made mandatory by

suspension of driving privileges beyond the one-year

minimum

Section

is

discretionary.”

Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582, 288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2012).

discretionary decision

is

m

18-8005(6)(d);

When

a

trial

any

court’s

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to

determine Whether the lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently With

speciﬁc choices before

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

any

legal standards applicable t0 the

exercise 0f reason.

State V. Herrera,

164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
In contrast, issues of justiciability, such as ripeness,

Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005)

may be

freely reviewed.

(citations omitted).

m

Marx Has

C.

To Show That The

District

that the district court

abused

Failed

Marx’s claim

absolute suspension of [her] driving privileges”

p.5.)

is

Court Abused
its

to prevent courts

omitted).

P.3d

at

test in Idaho, a

“When

it

imposed a ﬁve-year

suit

and asks whether a case

is

brought too

958. “The purpose 0f the ripeness requirement

from entangling themselves

“Under the ripeness

Discretion

not ripe for appellate review. (Appellant’s Brief,

“The ripeness doctrine concerns the timing 0f a

early.” Ma_nley, 142 Idaho at 342, 127

discretion

Its

in purely abstract disagreements.”

party must

show

Li.

is

(citation

(1) the case presents deﬁnite

and

concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial controversy exists (as opposed t0 hypothetical facts); and
(3) there is a present

There

is

need for adjudication.”

n0 present need

I_d.

(citations omitted).

for adjudication.

Upon

conviction for felony DUI, Idaho

Code

section 18-8005(6)(d) provides, in part, that the defendant “[s]ha11 have his driving privileges

suspended by the court for a mandatory

minimum

period of one (1) year after release from

imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind.”

I.C.

§ 18-8005(6)(d). Section 18-8005(6)(d) provides further that a defendant’s driving privileges

may

be “suspended by the court for an additional period not t0 exceed four
defendant

may request restricted driving privileges.”

(4) years, during

which the

I_d.

In an exercise 0f its discretion, the sentencing court “impose[d] a ﬁve-year driver’s license

suspension.” (7/9/1 8 Tr., p.528, Ls.4-6; R., p.360.) The court recognized that

restricted

driving privileges

during the additional four-year suspension pursuant t0

8005(6)(d). Hence, the court explicitly instructed

“And

I

know

ask for that.”

there are

some provisions

Marx could

Marx that she could seek such privileges,

for a restricted license at

(7/9/18 Tr., p.528, Ls.6-8.)

court’s clariﬁcation that

Marx could request

some

point.

You

§ 18-

stating,

can certainly

Despite statutory authorization and the sentencing

“certainly ask for” a “restricted license at

some point” during

her suspension,

8;

ﬂ

Marx has

yet to petition the court for a restricted license. (7/9/1 8 Tr., p.528, Ls.6-

She has also made no attempt

R., pp.2-20.)

to

show

that restricted driving privileges are

necessary for her employment 0r for family health needs.

(E R., pp.2-20.)

yet sought restricted driving privileges, as required

§

by

Because she has not

18-8005(6)(d), her challenge to the

driver’s license suspension is not ripe for appellate review.

Even if the

court determines that this issue

court acted “beyond

its

legal authority”

is ripe,

and thus “abused

absolute suspension 0f [her] driving privileges.”

Marx
its

erroneously argues that the district

discretion

.

.

.

by imposing a ﬁve-year

(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)

Idaho Code

§

18-

8005(6)(d) states that a person found guilty of felony DUI,
Shall have his driving privileges suspended

minimum

by

the court for a mandatory

period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, during Which

time he shall have absolutely n0 driving privileges of any kind, and may have his
driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional period not to exceed
four (4) years, during Which the defendant may request restricted driving privileges
that the court may allow if the defendant shows by a preponderance 0f the evidence
that driving privileges are necessary for his

employment or

for family health

needs[.]

LC.

DUI

§ 18-8005(6)(d).

is

The

plain language of the statute states that a person found guilty of felony

not eligible for restricted privileges during the one-year mandatory

period. Li.

The

plain language also states that the district court

restricted driving privileges during

minimum

“may allow”

any period 0f suspension beyond the ﬁrst

suspension

a defendant t0 have

year.

Li (emphasis

added). However, as a prerequisite to receiving restricted driving privileges, the defendant must
ﬁrst request restricted privileges and then

make

a showing that such restricted privileges are

necessary for the limited purposes of “employment or for family health needs.” Li. Accordingly,

under the plain language of the

statute, a

defendant’s driving privileges remain suspended Without

restricted privileges—in other words, absolutely

suspended—even beyond the mandatory one-

year suspension, unless and until (1) the defendant requests restricted privileges; (2) the defendant

shows by a preponderance 0f the evidence

employment or

for family health needs;

that restricted driving privileges are necessary for her

and

(3) the court, in its discretion, grants the defendant’s

request for restricted driving privileges.

The

district court acted

within the boundaries of its discretion

suspension 0f Marx’s driving privileges upon her second felony

DUI

conviction.

The judgment of conviction and

defendant’s driver’s license 0r permit
§ 18-8005, during

is

when

Will

the order of probation both state, “[T]he

(5) years, pursuant t0 I.C.

have absolutely n0 driving privileges.” (46206

Nevertheless, the district court did not foreclose the possibility of

p.360; R., p.27.)

requesting restricted driving privileges in accordance with § 18-8005(6)(d).
court explicitly stated that
§ 18-8005.”

things too

won

’t

it

was suspending her driving privileges

much, but the likelihood 0f you getting a
I

Marx

the contrary, the

ﬁve years “pursuant

“restricted license at

Marx has

restricted license

from

me

would say very slim objectively considering your record.”

p.528, Ls.8-13 (emphasis added)).

needs.

for

T0

R.,

t0 I.C.

Furthermore, the record reveals that the court told Marx, “I don’t want to prejudge

say none, but

privileges

imposed a ﬁve-year

DUI conviction and sixth lifetime

suspended for a period of ﬁve

Which time Defendant

it

The court

also stated that

Marx could

some point” during the period 0f her suspension.

yet t0 heed the court

are very slim.

(E 7/9/18

I

Tr.,

“certainly ask for” a

(7/9/1 8 Tr., p.528, Ls.6-8.)

the requisite steps of requesting restricted

by taking

and showing that restricted privileges are necessary for her employment or family health

Consequently, her driving privileges remain absolutely suspended, without restricted

privileges, in accordance With the requirements

of

§ 18-8005(6)(d)

and

in accordance with the

language 0f the judgment 0f conviction and order suspending sentence after retained jurisdiction

and order ofprobation. Marx’ driving privileges will remain absolutely suspended unless and until
(1) she requests restricted driving privileges; (2) she

shows by a preponderance of the evidence

that

such restricted privileges are necessary for her employment or for family health needs; and

(3) the district court, in its discretion, grants her request.

Because

§

18-8005(6)(d) places the

burden 0n the defendant to seek restricted driving privileges during any additional suspension
period,

Marx has

failed to

show that the

W

district court

abused

its

discretion

by ordering a ﬁve-year

absolute suspension of her driving privileges.

The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the order suspending sentence

after

retained jurisdiction and order 0f probation.

DATED this 25th day 0f November, 2019.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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